We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient-optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee-for-service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee-for-service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition.
| INTRODUCTION
Starting with the seminal papers by Ellis and McGuire (1986, 1990) and Ellis (1998) , an extensive literature has investigated the extent to which physician payment like capitation (CAP) and fee-for-service (FFS) lead to deviations from patient-optimal medical treatment (for an overview see, e.g., Iversen & Lurås, 2006) . This literature includes both theoretical and empirical contributions, the latter of which mostly contain field evidence. While CAP payment embeds an incentive to provide fewer medical services than would be optimal for the patient, FFS payment induces physicians to supply more (e.g., Ellis & McGuire, 1986) .
Field evidence on the relationship between physician payment and medical treatment decisions is rather mixed. Some studies observe that physicians respond to payment incentives (e.g., Davidson et al., 1992 , Gaynor & Gertler, 1995 , Devlin & Sarma, 2008 , Clemens & Gottlieb, 2014 . Others do not find a strong link (e.g., Grytten & Sørensen, 2001; Hurley & Labelle, 1995; Hutchison, Birch, Hurley, Lomas, & Stratford-Devai, 1996) . Field research often struggles with simultaneous variations of more than one component of the payment system or potential selection biases regarding patient characteristics, which make causal inferences on the direction and strength of an effect rather difficult (e.g., Falk & Heckman, 2009; Gosden et al., 2001 ).
In recent years, research in health economics has started to use economic experiments to test the behavioral effects of physician payment under controlled laboratory conditions (e.g., Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, & Wiesen, 2016 , 2017 Green, 2014; Hennig-Schmidt, Selten, & Wiesen, 2011) . Although there is an active debate on the extent to which insights from the laboratory can be generalized to the field (e.g., Herbst & Mas, 2015; Levitt & List, 2007) , laboratory experiments typically serve to complement field research as they allow for a higher internal validity. In the laboratory, ceteris paribus changes of parameters can be implemented and their effects on individual behavior can be directly observed. External aspects like patients' health status can be isolated and, if behavior changes, this variation can be attributed to the modified parameter (e.g., the payment system). Accordingly, laboratory experiments provide a suitable tool to test health economic models. 1 Experimental research on physician payment has revealed that monetary incentives affect medical treatment. In line with the theoretical prediction, patients receive significantly more medical services under FFS than under CAP payment. This holds true independently of the subject pool, that is, physicians, medical students, and nonmedical students (BrosigKoch et al., 2016) . Laboratory studies further suggest that medical service provision is not only guided by individual profit but also by patient benefit. Godager and Wiesen (2013) measure the weight subjects attach to patient benefit. They find that the majority of subjects put a higher weight on patient benefit than on own profit. This supports the assumption of physician altruism commonly made in the theoretical health economics literature (e.g., Allard, Jelovac, & Léger, 2011; Chalkley & Malcomson, 1998; Choné & Ma, 2011; Ellis & McGuire, 1986 , 1990 McGuire, 2000) . Godager and Wiesen (2013) further observe a substantial heterogeneity in the degree of individual altruism. Focusing on mixed payment systems, Brosig-Koch et al. (2017) demonstrate that individual responses can be accounted for by a behavioral model capturing physician altruism. In line with Godager and Wiesen (2013) , the weight subjects attach to patients' health benefit differs substantially among subjects. Again, these results do not depend on subjects' medical background.
So far, the experimental literature on physician payment restricts attention to medical service provision that is made in the absence of competition.
2 We contribute to this literature by exploring how competition affects the distortion of medical treatment caused by payment incentives. On the basis of a model of physician competition, we derive behavioral predictions that are then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Motivated by the experimental findings on physician altruism, our model allows for heterogeneity in the weight individuals attach to patients' health benefit. Although theoretical research mostly admits that competition between physicians can reduce the distortion of behavior under certain conditions (e.g., Allard, Léger, & Rochaix, 2009; Gaynor & Town, 2012; Gravelle & Masiero, 2000; Karlsson, 2007) , field evidence on the effects of physician competition is scarce and results are rather mixed. Pike (2010) investigates the relationship between GP's quality of medical care (number of referrals to specialists, patient satisfaction) and the degree of competition (number of nearby rivals) in England. He reports that more competition is correlated with a higher level of quality. Dunn and Shapiro (2015) focus on the impact of competition on the quantity and type of health services provided by cardiologists. They observe that, with FFS payment, a higher market concentration increases the use of cardiac catheterization but decreases the probability of a less invasive diagnostic test being performed. Moreover, a higher concentration leads to fewer readmissions but does not affect mortality. Iversen and Ma (2011) use Norwegian data of GP radiology referrals to study the relationship between competition and the number of referrals. They observe that competition leads to a higher number of referrals. Godager, Iversen, and Ma (2015) re-examine the effect of competition on GP referrals in Norway and include some additional controls. They find that competition has no or only a small positive effect on the number of referrals.
In this study, we use a controlled laboratory experiment to test the effects of competition on medical service provision. In our set-up, two subjects take the role of physicians and repeatedly interact with each other over 20 rounds. In every round, there are four patients to be treated by the two physicians. Two patients are permanently allocated to the same physician with each physician treating one of them. The other two patients are recurrently reassigned to the physician providing the highest health benefit. If both physicians provide identical benefit, patients split equally between the two. In each round, the two physicians simultaneously decide on their level of medical treatment. Each pair of decisions jointly determines the physicians' profit, which depends on the payment system and the number of patients treated.
1 An elaborate discussion of the relationship between economic theory and experimental economics is included in, for example, Part II of the Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology (Fréchette & Schotter, 2015) . 2 Huck, Lünser, Spitzer, and Tyran (2016) examine the provision of a credence good employing a 2 × 2 design with insurance and competition. Compared to their baseline treatment, insurance leads to higher consultation rates and higher overtreatment (two-sided moral hazard). The adverse effects of insurance are mitigated when competition is combined with insurance. The study does not focus on provider payment, however.
Experimental conditions vary patient health outcomes and physician incentives. This allows to isolate the effects of competition and to control for potentially important factors like patient characteristics and payment systems.
Our assumptions regarding patient behavior serve to reflect the observation that people choose their doctor largely on the basis of convenience and/or some form of quality (e.g., Biørn & Godager, 2010; Dixon, Gravelle, Carr-Hill, & Posnett, 1997; Salisbury, 1989) . Given that quality has several dimensions, which vary in their degree of observability, our set-up captures not only situations where a patient chooses a doctor largely on the basis of observable quality dimensions (e.g., Dranove & Jin, 2010) but also situations where the patient is informed by an expert (e.g., Beukers, Kemp, & Varkevisser, 2014; Brekke, Nuscheler, & Straume, 2007) .
The experiment is designed such that a trade-off arises between patient-optimal and profit-maximal treatment decisions in the absence of competition and that introducing competition yields a unique theoretical prediction, where both physicians choose the patient-optimal treatment level. This prediction is robust against introducing altruistic preferences on the part of the physicians, both for the case of commonly known degrees of altruism and when a physician's degree of altruism represents her private information. Theoretically, our framework leaves no scope for collusive behavior (i.e., deviations from the patient optimum in the direction of the joint profit maximum). Previous experimental research on finitely repeated games reveals that collusion can still be observed (e.g., Potters & Suetens, 2013) . Our experiment tests whether this result holds also for our medical decision setting in which real patients benefit from treatment decisions and, if so, whether it depends on patient characteristics and physician payment.
| EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP

| Design
In all experimental conditions with competition, subjects face the following decision situation: Taking the role of physicians, subjects are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs, which remain fixed over the 20 rounds of the experiment. In each round, each of the two subjects i in each pair simultaneously and independently decides on the level of medical treatment q i ∈ Q ≔ {0, 1, …, 10}, which is then applied to all of her patients in that round.
3 Any decision on q i has three effects: It determines the health benefit of patients treated by this physician, B(q i ); it determines the physician's profit per patient treated, π(q i ); and it affects the number of patients treated, n i (q 1 , q 2 ). Each pair of subjects is faced with four patients who exhibit identical health characteristics. Patients only differ regarding their mobility: Regular patients always visit the same subject, whereas undecided patients visit the subject providing the highest patient benefit. In case of a tie, undecided patients split up evenly. In our set-up, there is one regular patient assigned to each subject. Accordingly, depending on the treatment choices made by both subjects, a subject treats at least one and at most three patients.
4
For each of our competition conditions, we employ a baseline condition without competition where profit and benefit functions remain identical to the respective competition condition. Here, each subject independently decides on the level of medical treatment for one regular patient per round. As in the competition conditions, decisions are repeated over 20 rounds.
Our design of physicians' profits and patients' benefits is based on Brosig-Koch et al. (2016 , 2017 . 5 For each patient treated, a subject receives a remuneration R(q) and incurs a cost c(q) = 0.1q 2 . 6 There are two types of remuneration tested 3 The level of medical treatment q can be interpreted as investment in medical equipment (e.g., in new technologies or in the development of new skills).
As such our set-up includes a scenario in which (a) physicians choose a level of medical equipment, (b) patients observe the investment decisions made by the two physicians, and (c), unless they are regular patients, choose a physician based on their benefit which results from the investment decisions. As investments in medical equipment are not too difficult to observe for patients and as patients might condition their physician choice on this equipment, we think that this set-up provides a rather realistic decision environment.
in the experiment-FFS and CAP. In CAP, each subject receives a lump-sum payment per patient of 10; that is, R CAP (q) = 10. In FFS, the remuneration increases with the treatment level; that is, R FSS (q) = 2q. Accordingly, a subject's profit per patient is π CAP (q) = 10 − 0.1q 2 in CAP and π FSS (q) = 2q − 0.1q 2 in FFS. Observe that the profit per patient is symmetric between CAP and FFS in that π CAP (q) = π FSS (10 − q) for all q ∈ Q. Figure 1 illustrates the profit per patient for both experimental conditions, CAP and FFS. Subject i's total profit is given by the number of patients treated times the profit per patient; that is, π i (q 1 , q 2 ) = n i (q 1 , q 2 )π(q i ), where π(q) ∈ {π CAP (q), π FSS (q)} depends on the experimental condition.
Each level of medical treatment q results in a patient benefit B(q). We distinguish two patient types: For patients with a high severity of illness (H), the patient-optimal level is q * = q H := 7. For patients with a low severity of illness (L), the patient-optimal level is q * = q L := 3. The patient-optimal level serves as a benchmark for identifying the extent of overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The maximum patient benefit is 10 for both patient types. Figure 2 depicts the patient benefit for the two patient types. Observe that the patient benefit B(·) is concave, it is characterized by a unique global maximum, and it is mirror-symmetric at this maximum. The symmetric design of profits and benefits allows to directly compare behavior between the two payment systems (i.e., it allows to test whether incentives to underprovide in CAP are equally effective as incentives to overprovide in FFS). The patient benefit B(q) is given in monetary terms and is known to subjects. Although no subject takes the role of patients, real patients outside the laboratory benefit from subjects' treatment decision. In particular, subjects are informed that the monetary value of the total patient benefit is transferred to an organization (Christoffel Blindenmission) that cares for real patients with eye cataract (see Section 2.2). So subjects' decisions affect real patients' health. 
| Experimental protocol
The computerized experiment was run at the Essen Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, and programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . One hundred and seventy-eight student participants were recruited using the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) . As Brosig-Koch et al. (2016 , 2017 do not find qualitatively different responses to CAP and FFS between medical students and students from other fields, our study is based on a conventional student subject pool. In total, we employed four competition conditions and four no-competition conditions varying the payment system (FFS vs. CAP) and the patient type (H vs. L). Table 1 provides an overview. Matching subjects in pairs in our competition conditions, we generated 12 (11) independent observations per session in these conditions (because one pair of subjects provides one statistically independent observation after providing feedback information from round 2 on).
7 Of the 178 participants in the experiment, 96 were male and 82 were female.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to cubicles. Subsequently, the instructions were handed out and subjects were given sufficient time to read them. Clarifying questions were answered in private. To check whether subjects understood the set-up, they were given a set of control questions. The experiment started once all subjects had answered the questions correctly. At the beginning of each competition condition, subjects were randomly matched in pairs, which remained fixed over the 20 rounds. A history table summarized all relevant information on the subjects' current and past rounds, that is, the chosen treatment levels, the benefit per patient treated, the total profit per round, and-for the competition conditions-the number of patients treated by each of the two subjects (instructions are included in Appendix S1).
Physician profit and patient benefit were given in Taler. As this experiment tests repeated interaction, each decision round was payoff-relevant. At the end of the experiment, physician profits and patient benefits were summed up, and the amounts in Taler To ensure a credible transfer, we randomly selected a subject after the experiment to monitor the transfer procedure. This subject had to verify that a correct transfer order was sent to the university's financial department. The monitor and experimenter then walked together to the nearest mailbox and deposited the order in a sealed envelope. The monitor was paid an additional Euro 5 (see, e.g., HennigSchmidt et al., 2011, for a similar transfer and monitoring procedure).
| THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
We continue with deriving the equilibrium predictions of our experimental design. In particular, we show that our predictions are robust against introducing physician altruism. 7 More precisely, as we provide information feedback about the partner's behavior after each round and use a fixed matching, one pair of subjects provides one statistically independent observation.
8 The different exchange rates account for the different durations of the experimental conditions.
| Absence of competition
To allow for altruism, let
denote the utility of a physician, who exhibits a degree of altruism α ∈ [0, 1] and chooses a treatment level q ∈ Q. Accordingly, a physician maximizes a weighted average of profit π(q) and patient benefit B(q). By symmetry of the design, CAP_L and FFS_L represent mirror images of FFS_H and CAP_H, respectively. In the absence of competition, a profit maximizing physician (α = 0) chooses q CAP ≔ 0 in CAP and q FFS ≔ 10 in FFS, independently of the patients' type (L vs. H). A purely altruistic physician (α = 1) maximizes patient benefit and hence chooses q * = q L in L and q * = q H in H, independently of the payment system (CAP vs. FFS). In the intermediate case, α ∈ (0, 1), a trade-off arises between maximizing physician profit and maximizing patient benefit. Correspondingly, a physician chooses q CAP (α) ∈ {0, 1, …, q * } and q FSS (α) ∈ {q * , …, 9, 10}. As we have q * = q L in L and q * = q H in H, the tradeoff is more pronounced in conditions FFS_L and CAP_H (and less so in FFS_H and CAP_L).
| Competition
Under competition, a physician's total profit additionally depends on the number of patients treated, n i (q 1 , q 2 ), which is in turn jointly determined by the choice (q 1 , q 2 ) of the two physicians, that is, π i (q 1 , q 2 ) = n i (q 1 , q 2 ) π(q i ). Total patient benefit depends on the number of patients treated as well. We set B i (q 1 , q 2 ) = n i (q 1 , q 2 ) B(q i ), for i = 1 , 2. As before, profit per patient and hence total profit depends on the payment system (CAP vs. FFS) whereas patient benefit depends on the patient type (L vs. H).
To allow for altruistic preferences, let α = (α 1 , α 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 denote the degree of altruism of physicians 1 and 2. Each physician is assumed to maximize utility, which represents a weighted average of total profit and total patient benefit; that is,
The structure of the game and the objectives in particular is assumed to be common knowledge among physicians. The proposition below identifies the Nash equilibrium of this stage game for each of the experimental conditions. It shows that, independently of the payment system, each physician chooses the patient-optimal treatment level in equilibrium. The proof of the proposition is instructive in that it reveals that our experimental design is robust against introducing incomplete information about each other physicians' degree of altruism. The analysis is restricted to pure strategy Nash equilibria.
. Then the unique Nash equilibrium is given by (q
, where q * represents the patients' optimal treatment level, that is, q * = q L = 3 in L and q * = q H = 7 in H. In equilibrium, patient benefit equals 10 per patient in all four experimental conditions, total profit is 10.2 in FFS_L and CAP_H, and it is 18.2 in FFS_H and CAP_L. In any of these cases, the Nash equilibrium is strict.
Proof: See Appendix S2.
| Collusion
Because the stage game is repeated a finite number of times, its unique subgame perfect equilibrium involves repeated play of the stage game equilibrium. 9 Theoretically, our framework leaves no scope for collusion. On the basis of previous experimental evidence on finitely repeated games, however, collusion is to be expected for the earlier rounds of the interaction (see, e.g., Potters & Suetens, 2013 , or Engel, 2015 . Typically, the payoff-related key determinants of collusive behavior are considered to be (a) the short-run gain from breaking a collusive agreement and (b) the long-run loss from the collapse of future collusion. Figure 3 illustrates these key determinants for conditions FFS_L and FFS_H, respectively. There, the short-run gain (a) corresponds to the profit difference between the deviation and the collusion outcome, whereas the long-run loss (b) is given by the profit difference between the collusion and the equilibrium outcome. It can be seen that the long-run loss (b) from a collapse of collusion is larger in FFS_L than it is in FFS_H, whereas the short-run gain (a) from breaking the collusive agreement coincides for the two experimental conditions. Therefore, if at all, more collusion should be expected in FFS_L than in FFS_H. Exploiting the symmetry between CAP and FFS, a similar argument demonstrates that more collusion should be expected in CAP_H than in CAP_L.
| EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
| First round behavior
We first examine treatment decisions observed in round 1 as, in this round, behavior is not yet affected by learning or experience.
10 Our analysis focuses on subjects' deviations from the patient-optimal treatment level (see Figure 4) . The lower this deviation is (in absolute terms), the more patients profit from medical treatment. Without competition, we find overprovision in FFS and underprovision in CAP, which is significant for FFS_L(NC) and CAP_H(NC) (p ≤ .001).
11 Observed deviations significantly depend on the patient type (p ≤ .001). The less the 10 As stated above, given the assumptions of perfect rationality and common knowledge, there is no scope for time-varying behavior in the theoretical framework because the stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium and is repeated a finite number of rounds. However, time-varying phenomena such as, for example, learning and experience have been observed in finite-round experiments with unique stage game equilibria so that the isolated inspection of round 1 is warranted (see e.g., Selten & Stoecker, 1986) . 11 We apply nonparametric tests to the respective averages. For between-subject analyses, we employ exact Mann-Whitney U tests. For within-subject analyses, we apply exact Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests. When comparing decisions with predicted treatment levels, we use one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Throughout the paper, p values are reported from two-sided tests.
FIGURE 3
Incentives for collusion for patient type L and for patient type H in fee-for-service patient-optimal treatment level deviates from the profit maximum, the lower is the deviation from this level. In line with incentive symmetry, the payment system has no significant effect on the extent of deviations (p ≥ .467).
Comparing the competition and the no-competition conditions, we observe significantly lower deviations in conditions CAP_L, CAP_H, and FFS_L (p ≤ .039).
12 Thus, competition reduces the distortions resulting from CAP and FFS incentives. But even with competition, overprovision in FFS_L(C) and underprovision CAP_H(C) are still significant (p ≤ .005). Also with competition, average deviations significantly depend on the patient type in both schemes (p ≤ .005). Despite incentive symmetry, we observe weakly significantly different treatment decisions in CAP_H(C) and FFS_L(C) (p = .058). The payment system seems to somewhat affect behavior with competition but only in conditions in which incentives for collusive behavior are large enough.
| Behavior in later rounds
Figure 5 displays the development of average deviations from the patient optimum with competition (lines with triangle) and without competition (lines with circle). To make behavior in the two symmetric payment conditions directly comparable, we use adjusted average deviations. Adjustments are made such that individual deviations from patient optimum leading to an increase of individual profits are always given a positive sign and individual deviations leading to a decrease of individual profits are always given a negative sign. Due to this adjustment, both underprovision in CAP and overprovision in FFS have a positive sign. Without competition, we observe quite stable treatment choices in all conditions over the 20 rounds. With competition, average deviations from patient-optimal treatment remain close to zero in FFS_H(C) and CAP_L(C). Deviations in condition CAP_H(C) seem to converge only slowly to the patient optimum, whereas there seems to be even an increase of deviations in FFS_L(C). In fact, despite the incentive symmetry of the two payment systems, in the last two rounds, we observe a significantly higher adjusted deviation from patient-optimal treatment in FFS_L(C) than in CAP_H(C) (p ≤ .050). In both conditions, we still observe a (weakly) significant deviation from patient optimum even in the last round (p ≤ .084). Though, after round 1, in all competition conditions, average deviations are significantly lower than in the respective conditions without competition (p ≤ .030 over all rounds; p < .100 for at least 75 percent of the rounds per condition).
The findings on the competition conditions are confirmed when controlling for the dynamics of behavior in panel data models with random effects and clusters at the pair level. The adjusted deviation from the patient optimum is defined as dependent variable (see Table 2 ). To capture both effects of the experimental condition and dynamics over time, we consider as independent variables (a) the round; (b) dummy variables with value 1 for conditions CAP_H, FFS_L, and FFS_H (CAP_L, FFS_L, and FFS_H), respectively, whereas CAP_L (CAP_H) serves as baseline in Model 1 12 Note that the effect of competition in CAP_L is still significant, when excluding the few subjects who choose to overprovide in round 1 of this condition (p = .018). Notes. Models 1 and 2 only differ in the specification of the baseline condition. Baseline for Model 1 is CAP_L, and baseline for Model 2 is CAP_H. A negative coefficient reveals a reduction of deviation from patient-optimal treatment, thus, a better treatment quality. Clusterrobust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 10% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
***Significant at the 1% level.
(Model 2); (c) the interaction of condition and round to disentangle payment system and patient type specific effects of dynamics (CAP_L#round, CAP_H#round, FFS_L#round, FFS_H#round); and (d) personal characteristics, which are elicited by a questionnaire after the experiment. Personal characteristics incorporate a dummy variable for gender that is 1 for male and 0 for female, and field of study with the dummy econ taking the value 1 for economics students and 0 for students of other fields. Both characteristics might be related to selfish behavior (e.g., Brosig-Koch, Helbach, Ockenfels, & Weimann, 2011; Carter & Irons, 1991; Croson & Gneezy, 2009 ). Model 1 shows that subjects deviate significantly more from patient-optimal treatment in conditions CAP_H and FFS_L than in the benchmark condition CAP_L. Behavior in CAP_L and FFS_H does not differ significantly. Despite incentive symmetry, we find a general decreasing trend of deviations for CAP_H and an increasing trend for FFS_L, as the interaction terms of condition and round indicate. 13 Model 2 reveals that, initially, there is no significant difference between the two conditions. But, similar to Model 1, the interaction term of condition and round in Model 2 shows a significantly increasing trend of deviations for FFS_L compared to CAP_H. Apparently, subjects are more likely to coordinate on increasing the joint profit if incentives for this coordination are high and if this coordination implies providing more than what is optimal for the patient instead of providing less. 14 Neither model reveals a significant effect of personal characteristics like gender or field of study. 
| Tacit collusion
We now focus on pairwise choices made in the competition conditions and examine the incidences of tacit collusion distinguishing between full collusion, coordination as well as attempts of full collusion, and attempts of coordination (see Table 3 ). Full collusion occurs if both subjects choose the joint profit-maximal treatment level q = 10 (in FFS_L and FFS_H) or q = 0 (in CAP_H and CAP_L). Coordination covers all choice pairs with equal deviation between the patient-optimal treatment level and the full collusion treatment level (i.e., both subjects deviate by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 quantities, respectively, in FFS_L and CAP_H, and both deviate by 1 or 2 quantities, respectively, in FFS_H and CAP_L.). Attempts of full collusion/coordination relate to individual one-sided deviations from the patient-optimal treatment level. Table 3 additionally includes the number of pair decisions with at least one subject deviating from the patient-optimal level (which is equivalent to the sum of full collusion/coordination and attempts of full collusion/coordination). The number of pairs in which at least one subject deviates from the patient-optimal level but who failed to collude/coordinate is given by failed to collude/coordinate. Overall, collusive behavior is rather rarely observed in our experiment. In each of the 13 The results do not change if we exclude round five from the regression.
14 To account for the relatively small number of independent observations per condition, we made a robustness check by estimating bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications. This does not change the results.
15 Note that we also elicited personality dimensions through the Ten Item Personality Measure Questionnaire of the BIG Five (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) . We did not find any relationship between the provision of medical services, and the five dimensions of the Ten Item Personality Measure Questionnaire (none of these dimensions directly refers to altruism). Thus, we excluded these variables from further analyses. Notes. Rows 4-9: Frequencies among #pair decisions (Row 3) in parentheses. Row 8: "#with at least one deviating from patient optimum" is the sum of #full collusion, #coordination, #attempts of full collusion, and #attempts of coordination. Row 9: "#failed to collude/coordinate" is the number of attempts to collude/coordinate, for example, 22 out of 22 for CAP_L and 124 out of 140 for CAP_H. Frequencies among all cases with at least one deviating from patient optimum in parentheses.
a Duration is not known to the subjects (they only knew that there would be a "large number" of rounds, p. 117).
conditions CAP_L, CAP_H, and FFS_H, full collusion occurs in less than 3 out of 240 cases. In FFS_L, we observe full collusion in 21 cases, albeit concentrated in three pairs of subjects. In CAP_H and FFS_L, a considerable number of subjects tries to fully collude or to coordinate (140 and 123) but, particularly in CAP_H, often fails to succeed (88.6%). Table 3 also includes data obtained in a somewhat related Bertrand competition experiment run by Fouraker and Siegel (1963, FS) . Bertrand competition is related to our setting as both are modeled as games of strategic complements. To compare the incentives for tacit collision in FS's experimental set-up to those in our experiment, we apply the Friedman Index (see Friedman, 1971) . The higher the index is the higher is the monetary incentive to tacitly collude. Irrespective of the relation of the indices, we observe a higher share of fully collusive outcomes, a higher share of coordinated outcomes, and a higher share of coordination attempts in FS than in any one of our four conditions. Possibly, tacitly collusive behavior in a medical service provision setting is not as frequent as in a conventional price competition setting. However, the comparison has to be interpreted with care as there are other differences in design that might have affected the share of collusive decisions in FS.
To investigate how individual characteristics and past experiences influence actual behavior, we regress a dummy for choosing the collusion level-which is one if the maximum (minimum) treatment level in FFS (CAP) is chosen-and a dummy for the patient-optimal level on behavior in the previous round t-1, respectively (see Table 4 ).
16 L1.collusion is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if both subjects chose the collusion level in the previous round. The dummy L1.attempt_collusion_j equals 1 if only the opponent chose the collusion level and potentially signaled his willingness to collude. L1.patient_optimum captures the patient-optimal treatment choice of both subjects in the previous round. The impact of the case that only the opponent chose the patient optimum is given by L1.attempt_patient_optimum_j. L1.coordination is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if both subjects chose the same quantity in-between patient optimum and collusion level in the previous round. As the frequencies included in Table 3 suggest considerable differences between conditions, we also control for condition effects (CAP_H, FFS_L, FFS_H) and personal characteristics with the dummy variables male and econ. Regression (a) in Table 4 shows the impact of previous behavior on the likelihood of choosing the collusion level. Full collusion in t-1 significantly increases the likelihood of maintaining the collusion level. However, a unilateral choice of the collusion level by the opponent does not significantly influence a subject's willingness to choose this level. Furthermore, mutual choices of the patient-optimal level in the past round significantly reduce the likelihood of choosing the collusion level. Interestingly, in case of a unilateral choice of the patient optimum by the opponent, the likelihood of 16 As a robustness check we estimate the panel probit with bootstrapped standard errors. This does not change the main findings. choosing the collusion level significantly increases. Possibly, subjects signaling to reach a collusive outcome tend to strengthen their signal in case they observed a patient-optimal choice by the opponent. The regression also reveals a significant influence of payment incentives: In conditions CAP_H and FFS_L (in which the long-run loss from a collapse of collusion is high compared to the short-term gain of defection), the likelihood of choosing the profit-maximal treatment level significantly increases. Again, gender and field of study have no significant effect. Regression (b) analyzes the impact of previous behavior on the likelihood of choosing the patient-optimal level. As expected and in line with previous results, this regression shows that full collusion in the previous round reduces the likelihood of treating patients optimally. Furthermore, mutual choices of the patient optimum increase the likelihood of choosing the patient-optimal treatment. In conditions in which incentives for collusion are high (CAP_H and FFS_L), the likelihood of choosing the patient-optimal treatment significantly decreases.
To better understand the mechanism behind collusion and cooperation patterns, we further investigate imitation of the opponent's behavior (Regression (c)). Imitation is defined as choosing the same quantity the opponent chose in the previous round. We use the same explanatory variables as in Regressions (a) and (b) and additionally include a dummy variable that equals 1 if the payoff in the previous round is lower than the opponent's payoff in the previous round. Our results indicate that subjects exhibit a kind of imitation behavior: If the opponent's payoff realized in the previous round is higher than the own payoff realized in this round, the likelihood that a subject imitates the opponent's choice increases. Also choosing the same quantity as the other subject in the previous round (and, accordingly, realizing the same payoff as the other subject in this round) is positively correlated with imitation. This result does hold not only for a mutual choice of the patient-optimal level but also for coordination and a mutual choice of the collusion level. Moreover, as round is significant and positive, imitation seems to develop over time.
| CONCLUSION
In this study, we use a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate how competition in medical service provision affects patient outcomes. In line with the predictions of a model developed as a theoretical benchmark for this study, competition reduces the distortive impact of CAP and FFS payment. Without competition, we find underprovision with CAP payment and overprovision with FFS payment, though less pronounced than predicted with pure profit maximization. Observed behavioral patterns are consistent with an average degree of physician altruism α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, our results on conditions without competition are in line with previous experimental evidence on physician payment (e.g., Brosig-Koch et al., 2016 , 2017 Godager & Wiesen, 2013; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011) .
With competition, the deviations from patient-optimal treatment are lower than without competition. But even with finitely repeated competition, treatment choices still deviate from the patient optimum. Observed deviations depend on both, patient characteristics and physician payment. Deviations are higher for patients in need of a high level of medical treatment under CAP and for patients in need of a low level of medical treatment under FFS. Moreover, deviations from patient-optimal treatment seem to be somewhat higher with FFS than with CAP payment even though the two payment systems are symmetrically designed in our experiment.
Repeated competition seems to foster tacit collusion only when the long-run loss of a collapse of cooperation is high compared to the short-term gain of defection. Interestingly, deviations from patient-optimal treatment even increase with repetition under FFS payment (whereas they decrease with repetition under CAP). Possibly, under competitive pressure subjects perceive deviating from the patient optimum by providing too many medical services (which increases individual profit under FFS) less badly than by providing too little (which increases profits under CAP).
Nevertheless, the degree of tacit collusion observed in our study seems to be rather low compared to what is typically observed in price competition experiments. Apparently, medical service provision might be less prone to tacit collusion than decisions made in classical Bertrand environments. Moreover, as pointed out in the review by Potters & Suetens (2013) , collusion is particularly pronounced in markets with two sellers and more rarely observed when more sellers are involved. As such our controlled laboratory experiment provides support for the supposition that provider competition can have positive effects on patient health outcomes. A possible policy implication could be not only to foster the type of competition that is investigated in our laboratory study but also to be aware of attempts of tacit collusion.
As we use nonmedical students in our sample, one might ask whether our findings directly transfer to medical students or physicians. Previous results on the effects of FFS and CAP payment obtained by Brosig-Koch et al. (2016 , 2017 suggest that the different subject pools respond to incentives in a similar and consistent way. Accordingly, we are convinced that the positive effect of competitive forces on patient health outcomes will be also obtained with medical students or physicians. Moreover, the study by Brosig-Koch et al. (2016) reveals that physicians' behavior was less affected by incentives compared to medical and nonmedical students in that they responded in a more patient-oriented manner. This might imply that tacit collusion that leads to deviation from the patient-optimal level is even less pronounced between physicians, if at all. Whether this supposition is true or not is left for future research.
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